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**STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE  
(2008-2009)**

**(FOURTEENTH LOK SABHA)**

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

**STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR  
ARMED FORCES**

**Thirty Sixth Report**



**LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT  
NEW DELHI**

**February, 2009/Phalguna, 1930 (Saka)**

# **THIRTY SIXTH REPORT**

**STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE  
(2008-2009)**

**(FOURTEENTH LOK SABHA)**

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

## **STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR ARMED FORCES**

*Presented to Lok Sabha on 24.02.2009*

*Laid in Rajya Sabha on 24.02.2009*



**LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT  
NEW DELHI**

February, 2009/ Phalguna, 1930 (Saka)

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**COMPOSITION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2008-09)**

Shri Balasaheb Vikhe Patil - **Chairman**

**MEMBERS**

**LOK SABHA**

2. Shri Vijay Bahuguna
- \*3. Shri S. Bangarappa
4. Shri Milind Murli Deora
5. Shri Santosh Gangwar
6. Shri Jigajinagi Ramesh Chandappa
7. Shri Suresh Kalmadi
8. Shri C. Kuppusami
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10. Ms. Ingrid Mcleod
11. Shri Asaduddin Owaisi
12. Shri Adhalrao Shivaji Patil
13. Shri Shrinivas Patil
14. Shri Raju Rana
- \*\*15. Dr. H.T. Sangliana
16. Shri Arjun Charan Sethi
17. Prof. Mahadeorao Shiwankar
18. Shri Manavendra Singh
19. Shri Balashowry Vallabhaneni
20. Shri Rajesh Verma
21. Shri Anil Shukla Warsi

**RAJYA SABHA**

22. Shri A. Elavarasan
- \*\*\*23. Dr. Farooq Abdullah
24. Shri Jai Parkash Aggarwal
- \*\*\*\*25. Shri Abu Asim Azmi
26. Smt. Shobhana Bhartia
27. Shri R.K. Dhawan
28. Shri K.B. Shanappa
29. Shri Arun Shourie
30. Smt. Viplove Thakur
31. Shri M.V. Mysura Reddy
32. Shri Munquad Ali

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\* Ceased to be a member of this Committee due to his resignation from Lok Sabha w.e.f. 12.02.2009

\*\* Consequent upon his disqualification from Lok Sabha w.e.f. 3.10.2008.

\*\*\* Ceased to be a member of this Committee due to his retirement from Rajya Sabha w.e.f. 29.11.2008.

\*\*\*\* Ceased to be a member of this Committee due to his retirement from Rajya Sabha w.e.f. 25.11.2008.

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**SECRETARIAT**

- |    |                     |   |                  |
|----|---------------------|---|------------------|
| 1. | Shri Devender Singh | - | Joint Secretary  |
| 2. | Shri Rajeev Sharma  | - | Director         |
| 3. | Shri D.R. Shekhar   | - | Deputy Secretary |

## INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman, Standing Committee on Defence (2008-09) having been authorised by the Committee to submit the Report on their behalf, present this Thirty-sixth Report on the subject 'Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces'.

2. The Committee selected the above subject for examination during the year 2008-09. The Committee during their examination of the subject, took evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on 29 December, 2008 and 04 February, 2009 and also heard the views of General (Retd.) V N Sharma, PVSM, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) A.M. Vohra, PVSM, SM and Lt. Gen. (Retd.) G.S. Rawat, PVSM, AVSM on 13.01.2009 and Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) O. P. Mehra, PVSM, Admiral (Retd.) Sushil Kumar, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, NM and Air Marshal (Retd.) B. N. Gokhale, PVSM, AVSM, VM on 27 January, 2009 for an in-depth analysis of the subject.

3. Based on the written information furnished by the Ministry of Defence on the subject; memoranda submitted by ex-servicemen and experts; briefing/oral evidence tendered by the representatives of the Ministry and non-official witnesses; and the observations made by the members of the Committee, the Committee finalised and adopted the draft Report at their sitting held on the 20 February, 2009.

4. In this Report, the Committee have observed that the modern day warfare techniques require synergised and joint efforts on the part of different wings of the armed forces and the time is now ripe when the traditional structures of the Armed Forces have to be reorganized, integrated and geared up to meet the threat of growing asymmetric challenges having serious security implications for the nation.

5. Taking note of the fact that considerable time has elapsed since the Kargil Review Committee and Group of Ministers (GoM) submitted their reports, the Committee have observed that the required level of interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters is still missing. The Committee have accordingly, recommended that the staffing pattern in the Ministry of Defence be suitably changed,

6. In the light of the fact that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has no command and control authority over the Services other than his own, the Committee have expressed their surprise whether such a system will prove efficacious enough to ensure quick response and coordinated action in emergent situations. Considering the fact that the key to success in modern day warfare operations is the ability of the different wings of the Armed Forces to integrate their efforts under a single command without any loss of time, the Committee have opined that the creation of an additional post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to act as Chairman of the COSC is essential to ensure optimum level of jointness among the different wings of the Armed Forces and to provide single-point military advice to the Government. The Committee, have also recommended that till such time the post of CDS is created, the Government may take steps to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands.

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7. The Committee have also observed that the view that the country today faces entirely new dimensions of security threats and challenges, the Committee have therefore, urged upon the Ministry to continuously devise appropriate strategies to keep pace with the innovations being made in conventional and unconventional modes of warfare. The Committee have accordingly, recommended that the Government should constitute a high powered expert committee to reorganise, reform and restructure the Armed Forces with a view to implementing the recommendations made on the subject matter both by the GoM in its report submitted in 2001 and the Standing Committee on Defence in their earlier as well as this Report.

8. The Committee wish to express their thanks to the representatives of the Ministry of Defence and other non-official witnesses for appearing before them for tendering oral evidence and for furnishing the material and information on the subject matter in a very short span of time. For facility of reference and convenience, the observations/ recommendations of the Committee have been printed in thick type in the body of the Report.

**NEW DELHI:**  
**23 February, 2009**  
**04 Phalguna, 1930 (Saka)**

**BALASAHEB VIKHE PATIL,**  
**Chairman,**  
**Standing Committee on Defence.**



## **PART I**

### **STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFIED COMMAND**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1.1 In the wake of the Kargil conflict, a committee headed by Shri K. Subramanyam, commonly known as Kargil Review Committee (KRC), was appointed by the Government in July 1999, to review the events leading to Pakistan aggression in the Kargil district of Jammu & Kashmir and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard National Security against such armed intrusions. The KRC report was submitted on 15 December 1999 and an unclassified version of the report with security-based deletions was tabled in both Houses of the Parliament on 28 February 2000.

1.2 Following the submission of the KRC Report, the Government set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) on 17 April 2000 to review the National Security System in its entirety and in particular, to consider the recommendations of the KRC and formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GoM finalise its report on reforming the National Security System and submitted it to the Government in February 2001.

1.3 The Kargil Review Committee had observed that there was serious lack of synergy amongst the three Services of Armed Forces. Apart from that, there was also lack of coordination between the Armed Forces and Civil authorities. The lack of sharing of intelligence inputs between the three Services and Civil Intelligence agencies had further aggravated the situation. The Kargil Review Committee also had high expectations from the Government, Parliament and Public opinion to determine country security – Intelligence Development Shield to meet the challenges of 21st century.

1.4 The report was considered by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which, in May 2001, approved the GoM report and recommendations except those pertaining to institution of CDS on which it was decided that Government would take a view after consulting various political parties. As partial implementation of GOM recommendations, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) under the Chief of Integrated Staff to the Chairman Chief of Staff Committee (CISC) was set up on 01 Oct 2001 as an interim measure till CDS was nominated. The decision to appoint CDS was kept pending for political resolution.

1.5 The Standing Committee on Defence selected for examination and report the subject 'Review of Implementation Status of Group of Ministers (GoMs) Report on Reforming national Security System-in pursuance of the Kargil review Committee-A Special Reference to Management of Defence' during the year 2006-07. The Committee in their Twenty-Second Report had reiterated their earlier recommendation for creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in view of the observation of GoM that the functioning of the Chief of Staff Committee had revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provided single point military advise to the Government.

#### **Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS)**

1.6 According to the Background Note furnished by the Ministry of Defence, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was created on 01 October, 2001 as a sequel to the decision by the Group of Ministers based on Kargil Committee report (KRC). The staff of HQ IDS is provided from three Services, DoD, MEA, DRDO and Armed Forces HQ (AFHQ) Civil Services. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman COSC (CISC) is functioning as staff in the advisory mode to the Chairman COSC. Andaman and Nicobar Command (HQ ANC) and Strategic Forces Command were set up as India's first Integrated Commands. These symbolize how jointness needs to be fostered, and how this concept should be applied to other Tri-Service Commands when raised.

1.7 The Integrated Defence Staff comprises of Service Officers, Civilian Officers and Scientists and are allocated duties/roles and functions based on responsibilities of Integrated Defence Staff. The roles and functions of Chief of Integrated Defence Staff include supervising the coordination of long range plans, five year plans and annual budgetary proposals for the three Services and formulating joint doctrine in consultation with Services HQrs for the optimal employment of all military capabilities in all strategic and joint operations. Appointment of two star and above officers for the Integrated Defence Staff is done on turnover/rotational basis from amongst the three Services.

### **Jointness within the Services**

1.8 According to the Background Note furnished by the Ministry of Defence, the primary objective of the HQ IDS is as under:

“One of the primary objectives of HQ IDS is to promote jointness within the services. Jointness is aimed at obtaining optimal operational and cost effectiveness in the current and envisaged future geopolitical environment. It will also enable the services to operate seamlessly with common understanding of missions and joint strategies to accomplish them. This would entail brining about transformation and reforms within the armed forces.”

### **Achievements of HQ IDS**

1.9 As per the Background Note of the Ministry of Defence, HQ IDS and the Ministry of Defence have achieved a number of milestones within a short span in promoting the concept of jointness within the Services. Most of the issues common to the services are being dealt with by joint committees involving senior representatives of the Services and is an ongoing process.

1.10 According to the Ministry of Defence, the achievements of the HQ IDS is as under:

**“Defence Planning Process:** The Defence Planning Process is being strengthened as part of the follow up to the Group of Ministers’ report on Security. Draft National Security Strategy and the Defence Planning Guidelines have been prepared and are under process of finalization. The Defence Capability Strategy and the Defence Capability Plan are under preparation.

**Joint Doctrines:** Joint Doctrine for Defence Forces, Joint Amphibious Warfare Doctrine and Joint Special Forces Doctrine have already been released. The Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine, Joint Sub-conventional Warfare Doctrine, Joint Space Doctrine and Doctrine on Joint Maritime Operations are in process of being prepared.

**Defence Space Vision (DSV) 2020:** Space is the new frontier and applications positioned in this domain affect was fighting capabilities of all the three Serviced. The DSV 2020 document has been evolved and it has been decided that space should be treated as a tri service asset. An Integrated Space Cell has been established to co-ordinate space issues and formulate a Draft Joint Space Doctrine.

**Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP):** LTIPP is formulated by HQ IDS based on the Long Term Perspective Plans (LTPPs) received from the three Services with the objective to integrated important issues like the Joint Conventional Edge, capabilities to be achieved, aspects of commonality of equipment; inter-Service prioritization and Indigenisation.

**Integration between DRDO and Services:** HQ IDS has tried to bring about synergy in the 11<sup>th</sup> Plans of DRDO and the three Services. HQ IDS is responsible for producing the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plans for the armed forces and also preparing the Annual acquisition Plan which becomes the basis for defence procurement.

**Defence Procurement Procedure:** The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) is clearly the best example of inter agency and tri service jointness as implemented by the Ministry of Defence. HQ IDS has been given an enhanced role in the procurement process vide DPP. Its categorization Committees now examine and make recommendations to DAC on seven issues i.e. Acceptance of Necessity, Quantity, Categorization, Single Vendor Clearance, Nomination of Production Agency, TOT, Offsets and Trials. In the “Make” procedure, IDS is required to carry out feasibility studies for projects to be offered to private sector.

**Joint Intelligence Assessments:** With the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Agency, integration of service intelligence agencies and a common assessment of strategic intelligence inputs are now available to defence planners.

**Joint Committees:** A number of joint Committee have been instituted to further improve jointness in decision making, operations perspective planning, force development, intelligence, doctrine, training, logistics, personnel management, and communications and information warfare.

**Joint Exercises:** A number of joint exercises with other countries have been conducted by Headquarter IDS. AMPHEX 07 was a major tri service exercise undertaken to validate the Joint Amphibious Doctrine. A UN Peace Support Operations Exercise (UNPSO) involving officers from the Armed Forces of 13 countries was conducted at College of Defence Management under the aegis of HQ IDS in May 2008.

**Joint Training:** HQ IDS has carried out a review of the Tri Service Institutions and brought about changes in their training curriculum to bring in aspects enhancing jointness within the services, Committees have been set up with the focus to enhance jointmanship through joint Armed Forces Training Institutes (AFTI).

**Think Tank Organisation:** A Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) has been established in 2007; with Raksha Mantri as the Patron-in-Chief. The main objectives of CENJOWs, which functions under HQ IDS are, conduct of studies & research work in Joint War-fighting, organisation of orientation courses/capsules for various Ministries/ Agencies (including procurement agencies) connected with HQ IDS/Service and promotion of Jointmanship amongst Services, Ministries and Intelligence Agencies involved in National Security. CENJOWS focuses on Jointmanship amongst Services, Ministries and Intelligence Agencies connected with National Security, to conduct studies and research work in Joint War-fare vis-à-vis Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), Centre for Land Warfare Studies and National Maritime Foundation which are service specific 'Think Tanks' focusing on specialized aspects of land, sea and air warfare.

**An Indian National Defence University (INDU)** is being set up to increase jointness in strategic thinking, joint resources management, besides educating civilian officials at the JS/Director level, on strategic aspects.

**Disaster Management** HQ IDS is responsible to ensure a coordinated response for all disaster relief both within and outside the country. This integrates the efforts of the Services and other allied agencies at crucial junctures of disaster management thus bringing timely succor to the affected populace. Ministry of Defence has constituted Defence Crisis Management Group (DCMG) to deal with disasters and other crisis on the directions of the National Crisis Management Committee.”

## **Implementation of the Unified Command**

1.11 When asked about the status of implementation of the Unified Command, the representatives of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“This Unified Command, at the apex level, we still don't have and we also don't have a Chief of Defence Staff and perhaps much jointness flows from that concept. We still don't have that yet. I think the Committee is well aware of the progress made or the lack of progress. In fact, all political parties have been written to on this matter and the Government felt that this kind of a decision needed a political consensus across the board rather than being taken by the Government on its own. There does not seem to be a consensus at this point. We have had some responses, but, I think, the issue remains fluid and open at the moment.

As far as the other unified structures are concerned, these are handled by CISC.... In the joint structures, one unified command is the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which is rotationally held by each of the three Services. At present the Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command is from the Indian Navy. There are other joint organisations, which are extremely important. One of them is the National Defence Academy at Kadakvasla. Then,

there is the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington and there is also the Strategic Forces Command, which is also held rotationally by each of the three Services.

So, these are basically the joint structures within the Ministry of Defence, as far as I am aware. Of course, there is NDC which is also held rotationally. On the administrative side, I have said that there are two Commands. The IDS is the staff organisation essentially at Headquarters. The Operational Commands are the Andaman & Nicobar Commands and Strategic Forces Command”.

1.12 When asked whether the three services have worked together in operational times, the representatives of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“Well, Sir [redacted] has not always worked well. We cannot pretend that it has. One [redacted] only to see the war history than even the accounts of Kargil conflict that as related by the main actors themselves that they did not act with great synergies in all cases. These are matters of public domain, I do not think I am revealing any secrets.

The position, in fact, is that there is much better integration certainly with MoD now and we do have a single file system that their files come to us straight, they are put up to for a decision at whatever level it is required. So, that integration, in fact, works quite well. We hardly have separately files on any issue. Almost everything that we deal with originates from the Services HQs.”

1.13 When inquired about the system of writing of the ACR of the staff at HQ ANC, a representative of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“I call the systems of ACRs. Whosever’s ACR is to be initiated, there is a graded level above him, and normally in the Services, you have three levels of reporting – one initiation, one review and one next review; so is it in the Joint Commands, Andaman and Nicobar included, where at the appropriate level the ACR is initiated irrespective of the Service of the officer reported upon and irrespective of the Service of the assessor. It is reviewed by the next level again irrespective of which Service and it goes on. It is a totally inter-Service method of reporting and review. The same applies for Headquarters, IDS. In fact, it applies for all joint structures as they exist today.”

1.14 When asked about the mechanism put in place in case of differences between the services in the IDS, a representative of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“Sir, we have five Committees dealing with operations, maintenance, administration, acquisition and training issues, which are tri-services; and which are at the middle-level, which means at the Air Vice Marshal level and lower. They meet regularly and the inter-service issues are discussed threadbare. The decisions / recommendations are then passed through them up the ladder. They reach the Chairman, COSC, and on his recommendation the issue is further discussed at the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings where the decision is taken between the three Services and issues resolved amicably. This is the method that we are following.”

1.15 The representative of the Ministry of Defence stated further as under:

“I think the whole concept of an integrated defence staff has come into being after the Kargil. It is one of the lessons that was learnt from the Kargil. I believe that it has fostered jointness to a great extent. One of the lessons has been that though there has been a Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee, this Office has in fact become more potent after the Kargil and it is serviced by the IDS. It goes into a much larger number of issues than in the past.”

1.16 The Committee pointed out the contradiction in the Ministry’s stand that the present system of Unified Command is working well in the light of the action taken replies of the Ministry on the Twenty-ninth Report on the DFG (2008-09), where the Ministry had stated that ‘Component Commanders take instructions from the joint staff of HQ ANC and execute the given task as only they are competent to carry out the Service specific operations and it is not advisable to allow outside interference in their specialized fields/service’. Responding to the point raised by the Committee, a representative of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“He has got the powers to execute whatever he has been directed to do. Whatever orders are given, he has to execute, but the instruments of execution are under Component Commanders which are Service-specific.”

1.17 When asked about the pendency of dispute between Army and Navy in HQ ANC over the transfer of land, the representatives of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“The land issues remain Service-specific, but I will readily acknowledge that on this issue...Let me complete, Sir. On this issue, there is inadequate synergy between the Services. I do believe that there should be greater cooperation and synergy between the Services regarding land. Andaman and Nicobar’s is not the only case. We have several other cases where the Services are extremely reluctant to adjust to each other’s demands. I cannot offer a ready solution for this really, but I am sure it is something that will be addressed at the highest levels.”

1.18 Referring to the background note furnished by the Ministry on the subject that an integrated headquarter would be merely cosmetic in the absence of posting of Department of Defence cadre officers at Service Headquarters and for participation in policy formulation, the Committee enquired about the difficulty being experienced in allowing them to participate in policy-making issues. In reply, the representative of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“We do not really feel the need frankly.”

### **Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)**

1.19 When inquired about the effectiveness of the Chief of Staff Committee, a non-official witness stated as under:

“The three Chiefs are operational commanders of their respective Services. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is only a coordinator and he does not coordinate operations. He is only a coordinator for most tasks which are administrative and that also by a democratic process of agreement. He has absolutely no operational, command and control authority, no logistics or any other assets at his disposal. As the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, I used to just sit with my other colleagues, we used to discuss and come to an agreement, but most of the times, we disagreed and that is how we functioned. The Chairman, COSC is only a figurehead “Chairman.”

1.20 When asked about the power of the Chairman of the Chief of the Staff Committee (COSC), the non-official witness stated as under:

“Nothing. I would say quite categorically, nothing. I have been the Chairman of the three Services for two years. It is lip service. You are holding the post as a figurehead with no command resources. .... The present IDS which is in place has no resources for command and control. It is just a coordinating organisation with no operational resources and no command authority.

The CDS in America, England, France and Germany are operational command and control authorities. We in India do not have such a set up and that is why the operational control during 26/11 was chaotic. No body really knew who was controlling the operation at Mumbai or whether it was being controlled from Delhi or Mumbai.”



### **Post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)**

1.21 The Ministry of Defence while mentioning the observation of the GoM report to review National Security System that the COSC has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate and it needs to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS, have themselves admitted in their revised Background Note that the jointness flows from the very concept of CDS. About the creation of the post of the CDS, they stated in their Background Note that the Government felt that this decision needed a political consensus across the board rather than being taken by the Government on its own. All political parties have been written to on this matter and there have been certain responses. The consultation process is underway and decision will be taken after the same is completed.

1.22 While recommending for the creation of the post of CDS, the GoM had made the following observations:

“(a) Creation of a CDS would ensure provision of single point military advice to the civil political executive. Before presenting his advice, the CDS will consult the Service Chiefs and will inform Government of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to the subject in hand.

(b) Under the existing system, each Service tends to advance its own capability without regard for inter-Service and even intra-Service prioritization. Accordingly, one of the most vital tasks that the CDS would be expected to perform is to facilitate efficiency and effectiveness in the planning/budgeting process to ensure the optimal and efficient use of available resources.

(c) The capabilities of the Armed Forces can be enhanced significantly, if rather than operating as three individual units, they operate with a high degree of “jointness” and in close tandem with one another in the conduct of various tasks, including training.....Creation of a CDS would promote greater “jointness” in the Armed Forces.”

1.23 When asked about the qualifications of an officer to be appointed as the CDS, a non-official witness stated as under:

“I have suggested in my Memorandum that the Chief of Defence Staff should be of equal rank with that of the three other Service Chiefs, but he will be the first among equals since he will be the permanent Chairman of the Committee.”

1.24 On the qualification for the CDS, another non-official witness stated as under:

“I do not think that he should be a retired person. About the Chief of the Defence Staff, once the appointment is created, the Government will make up their mind, who the next Chief of the Defence Staff should be. The primary contenders would be the three Chiefs. But it need not be restricted to that. The Government, in their wisdom, from the serving officers selected the Chief of the Defence Staff. From the practical point of view, it would be better if it is one of the three Chiefs because then, he has the experience of commanding a particular service and it will be better fitted to head the team and become the superior officer of the three Chiefs.”

1.25 On being asked whether the CDS should not be of rank above the three Chiefs of the services, the non-official witness clarified as under:

“No. I said, he should be the same man. He should have the same basic pay, the same rank, four-star General, first amongst equals. That is, do not give him too much power and authority.....

1.26 He further stated as under:

“Basically, the Chief of the Army or the Chief of the Navy or the Chief of the Air Force is the Chief of his service. Therefore, he feels that he has to look after the interest of his service, and they cannot possibly come to a sensible, workable decision unless there is a person of the top of them. And, that person on the top has to be the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Chief of Defence Staff will then be responsible to the Government, and the three Chiefs should be responsible to him. He has the executive authority and his directions cannot be ignored by the three Chiefs.”

1.27 When asked whether the CDS would not be favorably pre-disposed towards the service he belonged to, the non-official witness stated as under:

“The point here is, as we have seen in America, Britain and in other nations, the man who holds this appointment, he rises above himself. You know everybody grows inside an appointment. When he has the confidence of the Raksha Mantri, the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the nation, he has to live up to that. Therefore, in the selection of this man, we have to select a man who has got a clear character and conduct and he has a clear aspect of knowledge and has proven so during his service on being correct in the legal aspects and subjected himself to the Constitution and the Indian Penal Code. This is the sort of man we have to select and we see over the years because a man who reaches this position would have had about 42 years of service and in 42 years of service, with every year reporting being done, it is very clearly indicated whether he has the other tendencies moral and character wise. So, if you have a man like this, he will grow into that position and other nations have done that.

Secondly, the man who is the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff, the person who is going to be his Personal Staff Officer need not necessarily from the same service because that is a rotational appointment. If, for instance, the Chief of Defence Staff is from the Navy, the Personal Staff Officer could be from the Army or from the Air Force and so on and so there will be a mixed staff. All the planning has to be done combined by an integrated staff.

Thirdly, the other three Chiefs are not going to keep their mouth shut if this person is doing something funny. They can also go to the Prime Minister and talk about it.”

1.28 On being asked about the reasons for the opposition to the creation of the post of CDS, non-official witness stated as under:

“I think, initially the opposition was from within the three Chiefs themselves. The reason for this was, initially, when I was there 18 years ago, my colleagues in the Navy and the Air Force, we were very good friends and we all accepted the need for this and we told .....the Rajya Raksha Mantri at that time that this is necessary.

Subsequently, over the years, I think, from about 1995-96, none of the three Chiefs wanted to lose command of his own service and get this appointment because the Government, at that time, was thinking that they would take one of the Chiefs and elevate him to this rank because of his experience. But since, at that time, there was no Integrated Andaman and Nicobar Islands Command, there was no Integrated Strategic Forces Command and there was no Integrated Defence Staff, none of these gentlemen were prepared to become just a Chairman of the Committee with no personal control over his own service and, therefore, they disagreed.”

1.29 Another non-official witness stated the reason for the opposition to the post of CDS within Services as under:

“There is a reason for it. Like all arms of the Government or all organizations, even the Armed Forces have their individual subcultures. We have our individual autonomy and our identity. I am a Naval Officer. I was born and bred as a Naval Officer for 45 years. I fought my battles as a Naval Officer and I would like to remain in Navy. But in this day and age, unless we unify, integrate and formulate a doctrine of integrated operations, we will always be behind the adversaries. In a sense, we need a fundamental doctrine, which is operationally compatible with integrated operations. We have to ensure networking and that is the key. That is what unification is all about.”

## 1.30 He further stated that:

“As far as the Army and Navy are concerned, they accept the integration of the command. But the Air Force had a different view point throughout. They said that they are a different breed of human beings and they said: ‘We have to fly above all of you people and we would not like one of your commanders to tell us what to do.’ We had explained to many Air Force Chiefs that you yourself may be the Chief of Defence Staff and we will have to accept what you say, but it is the combined group of four people, they have to come to a consensus in any case and once you reach that position you will be thinking of others also. But somehow the Air Force had some objection to this because of their highly technical service, which they felt that the Army and the Navy were not competent to understand. But it has not happened like that anywhere in the world where this appointment has been instituted. So, I think, it is the lack of a majority that prevented it from doing this. In our country, as we progress and more and more power comes, this may happen.

But then who does this Commander report to? So, if he has to report to Army Headquarters or Navy Headquarters or Air Force Headquarters, it is not correct because he is an integrated commander with all three Services under him.”

## 1.31 On the scope and ambit of the powers of the CDS, the non-official witness stated as under;

“As I tried to indicate earlier, first is the operational command in war and peace of the integrated command, which are inter-Service Commands. I mentioned the Andaman & Nicobar Command, the Strategic Forces Command, which handles the nuclear weapons and any further command that may come up. The Space Command is likely to come up. Then you may have a special command coming up for exterior operations, expeditionary operations across the sea or across the land borders. He should command that man and that person who runs that command for exterior operations would have to be an integrated forces commander with an integrated staff. So, that is the operational side.

As far as the decision making for administration of the three Services is concerned, the working out of the Defence budget in cooperation, of course, with the Ministry of Defence (Finance) and the working out of inter-service matters should be also handled by this man because he is going to be the first amongst equals of the Chiefs of Staff Committee where consensus is difficult sometimes. So, he will produce the consensus.

Then, he will be a single point reference and Military Advisor to the Cabinet and to the RM. That means, if there is a particular Service who does not agree with a certain line of ideas on finances or organisation or whatever, he will make up his mind as to what should be done and he can take that particular Service’s Chief with him to the RM or anybody else to decide the issue once and for all. So, at the moment because there are three commanders, in any joint operation, there is dichotomy of command.”



## 1.32 He further stated as under:

“Also, integration of logistics is a point that came to my mind. At the moment, we spend a lot of money in this country supplying fuel to the Army, Navy and Air Force separately, ammunition chains, fuel chains, transport chains. We can integrate this logistical business because after all except for aircraft which take a certain type of aviation turbine fuel, all other fuels are the same, whether it is for tanks or whether it is for normal trucks or whether it is for generators and similarly the ordnance stores are very similar. There may be an integrated command of logistics. There should be an integrated command of logistics, which Britain has already done. It should be under the Chief of Defence Staff.”

## 1.33 Another non-official witness, while highlighting the necessity of CDS, also brought out the weakness of the COSC as under:

“The primary task of the Armed Forces is the security of the country, and for any aggression that might be created against the country, the three Services have to coordinate their activities and jointly produce their mite to beat the aggression. For this coordination, it is essential that the Government should deal with one person. It cannot deal with the three Services separately. The three Services, in most tasks, have to combine their Forces and coordinate their activities, and this coordination can at best be done by somebody above the three Chiefs, and there should be the Chief of Defence Staff. Presently, the system that we are following is that we have the Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, and the Chairman is the Chief who became the Chief earlier than the other two. His term may extend to three months or a year, and it varies. He has no executive authority. If he makes a proposal, the other Chief can easily say, “No, it does not suit me.”

## 1.34 Another non-official witness explained the role and function of CDS as under:

“The Chief of Defence Staff is a separate post. He is the fourth commander. He is not one of the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. The Navy Chief, the Army Chief and the Air Chief remain where they are and the CDS is the fourth person. He is the over all operational commander. He has nothing to do with  single service. In fact, what happens if I explain the system please to you,  the CDS is allocated resources from the other three Services. He has his own command. Therefore, any “joint operation” is conducted by the CDS not by the individual services. Perhaps you are aware that operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ the US war on Afghanistan and Iraq attack by the American Forces was conducted by the CDS of the US Armed Forces and not by individual services. Each service (Army/Navy/Air Force) provides resources to the Joint Chief (CDS) who coordinates the operations.”



## **Restructuring the Ministry of Defence**

1.35 Under the heading 'Problems with the existing set-up', the GoM had inter-alia observed:

“There is a marked difference in the perception of civil and military officials regarding their respective roles and functions. There has also been, on occasions a visible lack of synchronisation among and between the three departments in the MoD, including the relevant elements of Defence Finance. The concept of ‘attached offices’ (now ‘Integrated Headquarters’) as applied to Services Headquarters; problems of inter-se relativities, multiple duplicated and complex procedures governing the exercise of administrative and financial power; and the concept of ‘advice’ to the Minister, have all contributed to problems in the management of Defence. This situation requires to be rectified, to promote improved understanding and efficient functioning of the Ministry.”

1.36 The Ministry of Defence in their first background note on the subject had stated as under:-

“Renaming of Army and Naval Headquarters as Integrated Headquarters is merely cosmetic, in the absence of posting of DoD cadre officers to Service Headquarters and vice versa, for participation in policy formulation.”

## **Deficiency of Staff in HQ IDS and HQ ANC**

1.37 The Ministry of Defence have in their background note also admitted that posts of officers from MEA, DRDO and Intelligence agencies to appointments created in unified organisations have not been carried out so far. In spite of Headquarter IDS and Headquarter ANC being established in 2001, the civilian support staff is largely deficient (in case of ANC approximately 90 %).

1.38 When pointed out that there is 90 per cent deficiency of staff in HQ ANC, the representatives of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“I am not sure of the exact shortage. There is shortage only in Andaman and Nicobar. This probably is a shortage there in all Departments because nobody wants to go there. To fill posts in Andaman and Nicobar, generally there is difficulty.”

1.39 When inquired, whether the Ministry have thought of giving incentive to encourage people to take up jobs in Andaman and Nicobar, the representatives of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“People do get incentive. I think this has been a perennial problem both in the North East and in the Andamans that it is hard to get people to go there.”

1.40 The representative of the Ministry of Defence also admitted that there is a need to give due weightage when one offers for serving in difficult areas while considering for his promotion. However a representative of the Ministry stated as under:

“Sir, in actual practice it really does not exist. It is because, what is there is advisory only that: "Yes, you have worked in North East. It would be taken into due consideration." That is advisory in nature. Sometimes it does tend to help. “

1.41 In their subsequent note, the Ministry furnished the following reports on the present status of deficiency of civilian support staff in HQ ANC:

**“Status of Civilian Staff at HQ ANC**

- (i) Group ‘A’ Senior Staff Officer (Civilian)- One post. (Vacant – to be filled on deputation, RRs not yet framed. DOP&T are yet to issue the revised guidelines for framing Recruitment Rules in view of implementation of revised pay scales of VI CPC).
- (ii) Other Group ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ posts-114 : The civilian Group ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ posts as per the PE are required to be filled up three Services in the ratio of 1:1:1. Out of 114, at present there are only 07 posted (03 from Nay and 04 from Air Force). Army has not provided any staff. The Services HQs had expressed inability to fill up the posts and have desired that since the civilian staff cannot be transferred to A&N Island without their willingness, the Service HQ have suggested for direct recruitment by empowering the HQ ANC.

Proposal for delegation of powers of appointing authority to DCIDS (DOT), HQ IDS in respect of Group ‘B’ and Commander in Chief, Andaman Nicobar Command (CINCAN) in respect of Group ‘C’ and ‘D’ posts is under process for approval of DOP&T. Once the powers are delegated by notification of the DOP&T. Once the powers are delegated by notification of the DOP&T, further action will be initiated to amend the PE, to include appointing of civilian staff through direct recruitment, frame the Recruitment Rules and then physically fill up the posts.”

### **Indian National Defence University (INDU)**

1.42 When asked about the status of the establishment of national Defence University, the representatives of the Ministry of Defence stated as under:

“Land has been finally identified for this in Haryana, in Rewari District, on one of the National Highways close to Delhi. A Cabinet Note has been prepared and is pending approval. We are also setting up a Committee of Experts to decide on what the components of this National Defence University should be. So, we are now awaiting Cabinet clearance for the proposal for the land as well as setting it up. So, I think that we have made much progress now. I think it will take about three years to set it up. We hope to get Cabinet approval within a month or so. “

### **Linkages between the DRDO and the HQ IDS**

1.43 When asked about the linkage between the DRDO and the IDS in physical terms, the representative of the DRDO stated as under:

“We have basically exchanged documents of long-term integrated plan which was evolved by each of the three Services - Air Force, Army and Navy. Their request was that our programme should largely merge with them. Obviously, the system projects are essentially mission-oriented projects for the users. So, that is one area where we have had a number of discussions between our Chief Controllers aided by the Technical Directorates and in some specific cases presentations by the laboratory, for example radars. For example, we developed this 3D Central Acquisition Radar as part of the Akash Project. The Air Force found its usefulness for the air defence role. So, there were discussions coordinated by IDS for use in the Air Force as well as for use by the Army. Finally this helped us to reshape certain additional requirements in terms of processing in that radar. Actual orders have now been placed for that radar. I am just giving you one example.”

1.44. When enquired, whether the Ministry of Defence have taken any steps to ensure that the training at the higher command level is conducted jointly for all the services as being done in the NDA, the Ministry of Defence furnished in their written reply as under:

“A number of institutions in the three Services impart joint training to the senior level Service officers. The details of such institutions and training imparted is given below:-



(a) **Combined Operational Review and Evaluation Programme.** The Combined Operational Review and Evaluation Programme is a final development programme for Maj Gen equivalents and above from the three Services, which focuses on Regional and National Security issues with a view to bring in more synergy, both at operational and strategic level within the Armed Forces; between Ministry of Defence and other ministries; and between the corporate sector and other National Security organs. The programme is being conducted annually by the three Services in rotation. A total of 18-20 officers participate in this programme.

(b) **National Defence College.** It is a premier training institution under the MoD. The College conducts a one-year course for 100 senior officers of the rank of Brig and equivalent of all the three Services of the Armed Forces of India, Foreign Defence Forces and Jt Secy/Director level officers from the Indian Civil Services.

(c) **Higher Defence Management Course.** The Higher Defence Management Course is conducted at the College of Defence Management which is the leading center of excellence in management thought which trains 99 select senior officers (rank of Cols and Brigs and equivalent) from the three services and Para Military Forces including Ministry of Defence in evolving, refining and honing management skills that facilitate efficient resource management.

**Senior Officers Study Period:** The senior officers study period is conducted annually over a period of 12 working days, with 25 officers of the three services (Air Commodore and equivalent). The main aim of the study period is to provide senior officers of the three Services a forum to discuss and exchange ideas and update their knowledge on the latest tactics, concepts and procedures. The objectives of the course are as follows:

- a) To provide an opportunity to senior level officers of the three Services to be acquainted with the philosophy of Air Operations.
- b) To broaden their outlook and perception of the happening within the region and globally.
- c) To put across their views on current issues of national importance.
- d) To interact with media.

**Higher Command Courses:** These courses are conducted for selected officers of the rank of Col and Equivalent of all the three Services to train selected officers for Command and Staff appointments. These courses are held at Army War College Mhow, College of Naval Warfare, Karanja and College of Air Warfare, Secunderbad. Apart from officers of all the three Services attending Courses at each of these institutes, there is also a combined capsule held for the participants of all these institutes, and the Higher Defence Management Course, which is held annually at Army War College, Mhow. This capsule is called JOCAP (Jt Capsule).

**Seminar:** Periodic Seminars conducted by various professional training institutions and think tanks like CENJOWS, CLAWS, CAPS and USI.”

**PART II****RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE*****Need for promoting Jointness within the Services***

1. Apart from a conventional war threat, the fast changing security environment has been posing serious challenges before India in the form of internal situation of externally envisaged proxy war scenario, growing menace of cross border terrorism and advancement in technology of nuclear weapons and missiles particularly during the last two decades. Undoubtedly, the modern day warfare techniques require synergised and joint efforts on the part of different wings of the armed forces and the time is now ripe when the traditional structures of the Armed Forces have to be reorganized, integrated and geared up to meet the threat of growing asymmetric challenges having serious security implications for the nation. The Committee's examination of the subject matter and their interaction with the experts having experience of serving the Armed Forces at the highest level has however, revealed that while certain steps have been taken to promote the concept of jointness within the Services, it is still at a nascent stage in the country. The Committee have dealt with some of the important aspects related to the subject in the succeeding paragraphs of the Report.

### ***Restructuring the Ministry of Defence***

2. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), constituted by the Government after the Kargil war had observed in paragraph 14.19 of its report that ***“India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure”***. They had also observed that ***“higher decisions on equipment, force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decision are more consensual and broadbased”***. The KRC had also expressed the view that: ***“Most opposition to change comes from inadequate knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the world and a reluctance to change the status quo..... In fact, locating the services Headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy”***. It was in this context that the KRC had recommended that that the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganized. Even the Group of Ministers’ (GoM) in paragraph 6.4 of its report on ‘Reforming National Security System’ had pointed out that the ***“concept of “attached***

*offices” as applied to Services Headquarters; problems of inter-se relativities; multiple duplicated and complex procedures governing the exercise of administrative and financial powers; and the concept of ‘advice’ to the Minister, have all contributed to problems in the management of Defence. This situation requires to be rectified, to promote improved understanding and efficient functioning of the Ministry.”*

Although considerable time has elapsed since the KRC and GoM submitted their reports, the Committee regret to observe that the required level of interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters is still missing as is evident from the candid admission of the Ministry that renaming of Army and Naval Headquarters as Integrated Headquarters is merely “cosmetic”. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommend that the staffing pattern in the Ministry of Defence be suitably changed to appoint the Armed Forces personnel of requisite expertise at the level of Joint Secretary and/or Additional Secretary so that the Armed Forces Headquarters may be intrinsically involved in national security management and apex decision making processes. Needless to say that such a system would not only provide an effective interface between the MOD and the different Services but will also go a long way in promoting and synchronizing jointness among the Services Headquarters.

***Chief of Defence Staff***

3. The Committee have been informed that the Chiefs of the Staff Committee (COSC) is a forum for the three Service Chiefs to discuss matter having a bearing on the activities of the Services and also to advise the Ministry. The position of the Chairman of the COSC presently devolves on a longest serving Chief of Staff and consequently rotates amongst three Services. In the light of the fact that the Chairman of the COSC has no command and control authority over the Services other than his own, the Committee are unable to comprehend whether such a system will prove efficacious enough to ensure quick response and coordinated action in emergent situations. Considering the fact that the key to success in modern day warfare operations is the ability of the different wings of the Armed Forces to integrate their efforts under a single command without any loss of time, the Committee are of the considered view that the creation of an additional post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to act as Chairman of the COSC is essential to ensure optimum level of jointness among the different wings of the Armed Forces and to provide single-point military advice to the Government. During their examination, the Committee have been given to understand that the post of CDS presently exists in 67 countries including France, Germany, UK and USA and the system has proved its efficacy in those countries. The Committee, therefore, desire that the Government should pay serious attention towards this aspect by

evolving consensus on this issue and taking timely and appropriate steps to revise the composition of the COSC by creating a post of CDS to act as Chairman of COSC. The incumbent so selected for the post may be a four-star officer drawn from the Services in rotation and be appointed for a tenure of not less than two years. The duties and responsibilities to be entrusted to the CDS may be decided by the Government keeping in view the objectivity and independence required for the purpose.

The Committee are of the firm view that till such time the post of CDS is created, the Government may take steps to give appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in the present set up to command and control the resources of the Defence Services whenever the situation so demands.

***Common Law for the Defence Services***

4. The Committee note that the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was created in October, 2001 as a sequel to the decision by the Group of Ministers based on KRC. HQ IDS is presently functioning as staff in the advisory mode to the Chairman, COSC and is headed by Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC). Considering the fact that one of the primary objectives of HQ IDS is to entail bringing about transformation and reforms within the armed forces, the Committee desire that the HQ IDS should also be entrusted with the task of reviewing the existing Acts applicable to the personnel serving in Army, Navy and Air Force with a view to enacting a common law for defence services personnel taking into account the present day requirements and the need for promoting the concept of jointness within the Services.

***Joint training for the Services Personnel***

5. The Committee understand that there are certain areas at the operational and strategic level within the armed forces which are common to two or more services. The Committee, therefore, recommend that these areas be identified at the earliest so that duplication of efforts and wasteful expenditure due to overlapping is avoided. The Committee also recommend that the Ministry of Defence should review their present policy of imparting joint training to the senior level officers in the Defence Services with a view to introducing modern day performance management processes aimed at fostering the spirit of jointness among them and also to prepare them to assume greater responsibilities in the current and envisaged environment of jointness within the Services.

***Foreign Training to Service Personnel***

6. In the light of the fact that a number of countries such as France, Germany, U.K and USA have adopted the structure of jointness in their armed forces, the Committee desire that the Government should examine the feasibility of seeking cooperation from such countries for imparting training to senior level armed forces officers willing to serve in their respective Services for at least two years after the training. The Committee feel that such a training with focused attention on the concept of jointness will go a long way in establishing the requisite level of synergy among the Armed Forces.

***Joint Intelligence***

7. The events in the past including Kargil intrusion and terrorists' attack in Mumbai on 26 November, 2008 have brought out the instances of lack of coordination among different intelligence gathering agencies including those of military intelligence resulting in loss of precious lives of defence services and police force personnel as well as those of civilians. While expressing their grave concern over the prevailing situation, the Committee strongly recommend that the Government should take immediate steps to constitute a federal central intelligence agency covering under its umbrella even the tri-service intelligence gathering network.

***Cross Attachments***

8. The Committee feel that cross attachment of officers in operational and planning wings of different Services at command level and above will help the officers in not only understanding the capabilities and limitations of different wings of the armed forces but also provide them an opportunity to gainfully utilize their experience in promoting jointmanship among the forces. The Committee, therefore, urge upon the Ministry to devise suitable strategies in this regard.



***Incentives***

9. In order to bring about synergy and to strengthen the jointness in the structure of the armed forces in a more effective manner, the Committee desire that the officers who have attended joint training programmes and/or rendered services in the cross attachments should be given incentives in the form of due weightage at the time of promotions and postings.

***Jointness between Navy and Coast Guard***

10. Events in the recent past have highlighted lack of coordination between Navy and Coast Guard resulting in national catastrophe. The Committee strongly believe that it is high time that the Government reviewed this issue in its entirety and initiated appropriate steps to put in place an effective mechanism for establishing better coordination and jointness between Navy and Coast Guard in the paramount interest of the national security.

***Deficiency of Staff at HQ ANC***

11. The Committee find it rather strange that even after eight years of its creation, HQANC continues to be deficient of civilian support staff with just seven officials in place as against the authorized strength of 115 posts. The Committee have been informed that the proposal for delegation of powers to appoint civilian staff in HQANC through direct recruitment is still

under process for approval of Department of Personnel & Training. While expressing their displeasure over lack of concrete steps to make good the deficiency of staff in a timely manner, the Committee hope that concerted efforts would atleast now be made to fill up the vacancies expeditiously so as to ensure that HQANC functions in an efficient manner.

*Setting up of Indian National Defence University*

12. The Committee note that the Group of Ministers in its report on 'Reforming the National Security System' had recommended for setting up of a National Defence University to undertake long term defence and strategic studies. The Committee are however, distressed to find that the Ministry are still awaiting Cabinet clearance for the proposal for the land needed for setting up of the proposed university and it would take another three years to establish it. The Committee deplore such inordinate delay on a matter so vital for fostering the necessary jointmanship in the Armed Forces and they desire the Ministry to take immediate steps to establish the Indian National Defence University without any further loss of time. The Committee would also like to be apprised of the precise steps taken in this regard.

***Need for setting up a High Powered Expert Committee***

13. The Committee strongly feel that the country today faces entirely new dimensions of security threats and challenges in the changing global scenario and there is an imperative need to continuously devise appropriate strategies to keep pace with the innovations being made in conventional and unconventional modes of warfare. In the light of the evidence tendered by the representatives of the Ministry of Defence and after hearing the views of the experts having experience of serving the armed forces at the highest level, the Committee strongly recommend that the Government should constitute a high powered expert committee to reorganise, reform and restructure the Armed Forces with a view to implementing the recommendations made on the subject matter both by the GoM in its report submitted in 2001 and the Standing Committee on Defence in their earlier as well as this Report. The Committee would like to be apprised of the steps taken by the Government in this regard.

New Delhi;  
20 February, 2009  
01 Phalguna, 1930(Saka)

BALASAHEB VIKHE PATIL,  
Chairman,  
Standing Committee on Defence

**MINUTES OF THE FOURTEENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON DEFENCE (2008-09)**

The Committee sat on Monday, the 29<sup>th</sup> December 2008 from 1500 to 1550 hrs. in Committee Room 'E', Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

**PRESENT**

Shri Balasaheb Vikhe Patil - Chairman

**MEMBERS**

**LOK SABHA**

2. Shri Santosh Gangwar
3. Dr. K.S. Manoj
4. Shri Arjun Charan Sethi
5. Shri Manavendra Singh

**RAJYA SABHA**

6. Shri Jai Parkash Aggarwal
7. Smt. Shobhana Bhartia
8. Shri R.K. Dhawan
9. Shri M.V. Mysura Reddy
10. Shri K. B. Shanappa
11. Smt. Viplove Thakur

**SECRETARIAT**

1. Shri Rajeev Sharma - Director
2. Shri D.R. Shekhar - Deputy Secretary
3. Smt. J.M. Sinha - Under Secretary

**REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

1. Shri Vijay Singh - Defence Secretary
2. Shri R.K. Mathur - Addl. Secy(M)
3. Lt. Gen NS Brar - DCIDS (PP&FD)
4. Vice Adml. DK Joshi - DCNS
5. Air Mshl. S. Mukerji - AOP
6. Shri Bimal Julka - JS (G/Air)
7. Shri Binoy Kumar - JS (O/N)
8. Shri Mukesh Kumar Sinha - Director (Budget)
9. Shri F.K. Pande - Deputy Secretary

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to the sitting of the Committee and drew their attention to the Direction 58 of the Directions by the Speaker, Lok Sabha. The Chairman then requested the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to brief the Committee on the subject 'Status of implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces'.

3. The representatives of the Ministry of Defence, then, briefed the Committee on various issues pertaining to the subject viz., present status of CDS, structure and functions of Unified Command such as headquarter Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and Tri-Service Command like the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) etc. The Committee also sought clarifications on issues pertaining to improving jointness in decision making, operations, intelligence, training, combating terrorism, finalisation of LTIPP and evolution of joint service doctrine. The Committee also desired to know the effectiveness of headquarter IDS & ANC with the deficiency of civilian staff in both the commands and in the absence of posting of DoD Cadre Officers in the Integrated Headquarters.

4. The representatives of the Ministry responded to the issues raised by the members. As regards, the points on which the representatives could not readily respond, the committee desired them to furnish written information at the earliest.

5. The copy of verbatim record of the proceedings has been kept.

**The Committee then adjourned.**

**MINUTES OF THE SIXTEENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON DEFENCE (2008- 09)**

The Committee sat on Monday, the 13<sup>th</sup> January, 2009 from 1100 to 1230 hrs. in Committee Room `D`, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

**PRESENT**

Smt. Viplove Thakur - Chairperson

**MEMBERS**

***LOK SABHA***

2. Shri Vijay Bahuguna
3. Shri Milind Murli Deora
4. Shri Santosh Gangwar
5. Shri Jigajinagi Ramesh Chandappa
6. Dr. K.S. Manoj
7. Shri Arjun Charan Sethi

***RAJYA SABHA***

8. Shri Jai Parkash Aggarwal
9. Smt. Shobhana Bhartia
10. Shri M.V. Mysura Reddy
11. Shri K. B. Shanappa

**SECRETARIAT**

1. Shri Rajeev Sharma - Director
2. Shri D.R. Shekhar - Deputy Secretary
3. Smt. J.M. Sinha - Under Secretary

**NON-OFFICIAL WITNESSES**

1. General (Retd.) V N Sharma, PVSM
2. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) A.M. Vohra, PVSM, SM
3. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) G.S. Rawat, PVSM, AVSM

2. In the absence of Hon'ble Chairman, the Committee chose Smt. Viplove Thakur, M.P. and the member of the Committee to act as Chairperson of the Committee under Rule 258 (3) of the Rules and Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. At the outset, the Chairperson welcomed General (Retd.) V N Sharma to the sitting of the Committee and requested him to brief the Committee on the subjects 'Status of implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces' 'Outsourcing of certain activities in Armed Forces' and 'Impact of Frequent Deployment of Armed Forces on secondary duties/ miscellaneous work' and also drew his attention to the Direction 58 of Directions by the Speaker, Lok Sabha. Gen. (Retd.) V.N. Sharma, then briefed the Committee on the aforesaid subjects.

3. As regards to the Post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the Armed, Forces Gen. (Retd.) Sharma expressed his opinion in favour of appointment of CDS. He also cited the difficulties being faced by the Government in taking quick decision in the absence of a Unified Command under CDS. He supported setting up of CDS with adequate check and balance system as was prevailing in the democratic countries like USA, UK. He also emphasised the need for setting up of new commands such as Space Command, Special Command for Exterior Operations in view of changing global security scenario.

4. On the issue of deployment of the Armed Forces personnel on secondary duties, Gen. (Retd.) Sharma stated that Armed Forces should be deployed in anti-insurgency operations taking place in border areas and Line of Control (LoC). At the same time he stressed on the need for modernisation of Central Paramilitary Forces and State Police Forces so that they could handle hand insurgency problems prevailing in different parts of the country.

Witness then withdrew.

5. The Committee then invited two other non-official experts Lt. Gen. (Retd.) A.M. Vohra and Lt. Gen. (Retd.) G.S. Rawat to express their views on the aforementioned subjects. Both the witnesses agreed to the need for having CDS and vesting executive power with the post. They also concurred with the opinion of Gen. (Retd.) Sharma that CDS should be a single point reference to the Government of India on the matters pertaining to external security of the nation.

6. The experts also responded to the queries raised by the members.

Witnesses then withdrew.

7. A copy of verbatim record of the proceedings has been kept.

**The Committee then adjourned.**



**MINUTES OF THE SEVENTEENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING  
COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE (2008- 09)**

The Committee sat on Monday, the 27<sup>th</sup> January, 2009 from 1100 to 1245 hrs. in Committee Room `D', Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

**PRESENT**

Shri Balasaheb Vikhe Patil - Chairman

**MEMBERS**

***LOK SABHA***

2. Shri Vijay Bahuguna
3. Shri S. Bangarappa
4. Shri Santosh Gangwar
5. Shri Jigajinagi Ramesh Chandappa
6. Dr. K.S. Manoj
7. Shri Asaduddin Owaisi
8. Shri Arjun Charan Sethi

***RAJYA SABHA***

9. Shri Jai Parkash Aggarwal
10. Shri R.K. Dhawan
11. Shri A. Elavarasan
12. Shri M.V. Mysura Reddy
13. Shri K. B. Shanappa
14. Smt. Viplove Thakur

**SECRETARIAT**

1. Shri Devender Singh - Joint Secretary
2. Shri Rajeev Sharma - Director
3. Smt. J.M. Sinha - Under Secretary

**NON-OFFICIAL WITNESSES**

1. Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) O. P. Mehra, PVSM
2. Admiral (Retd.) Sushil Kumar, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, NM
3. Air Marshal (Retd.) B. N. Gokhale, PVSM, AVSM, VM

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) O.P. Mehra to the sitting of the Committee and requested him to brief the Committee on the subjects 'Status of implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces', 'Outsourcing of certain activities in Armed Forces' and 'Impact of Frequent Deployment of Armed Forces on secondary duties/ miscellaneous work' and also drew their attention to the Direction 58 of Directions by the Speaker, Lok Sabha. Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) then briefed the Committee on the aforesaid subjects. On the issue of creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) he was of the opinion that the system in vogue was adequate and it improved the earlier deficiencies and a CDS equivalent was already in place, in the form of the Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC). Further, in case of differences of opinion, the political leadership should play a major role. He also stressed upon the necessity of improving upon the decision making process in the Government as well as the need of articulation of the Threat Perception by the political leadership. As regards the subject 'Outsourcing of certain activities in Armed Forces', he stated that the Defence PSUs should be granted autonomous status by the Government. On the issue of frequent deployment of Armed Forces on secondary duties, he was of the view that it adversely affected the Forces and this should be done only in exceptional circumstances. He stressed upon the need of strengthening the paramilitary Force.

Witness then withdrew

3. The Committee then invited Admiral (Retd.) Sushil Kumar and requested him to brief the Committee on the aforementioned subjects. He stressed on the necessity of the Unified Command and synergy among the three Services in order to avoid duplication of resources. On the issue of resistance to the integration of the three Services he opined that it was similar story the world over but certain countries adopted the policy of integration of the services gradually. He advocated for the creation of CDS. On the issue of outsourcing of certain activities, he opined that DRDO should be involved in only very selected and high value strategic missions. Further, on the frequent deployment of Armed Forces on secondary duties and it was he was of the view that they should not be diverted for normal secondary duties and it was advisable to bring them in case of major tragedies or national calamities.

Witness then withdrew.

4. The Committee then invited Air Marshal (Retd.) B.N. Gokhale and requested him to brief the Committee on the aforementioned subjects. Air Marshal (Retd.) Gokhale then expressed his views on the subjects. He stated that the existing system was working well and it should continue with its own pace and that creation of CDS would be premature at this point of time. On the issue of outsourcing of certain activities, he stated that the core activities should be identified and retained, whereas non-core activities could be outsourced. About the frequent deployment of the Armed Forces, he was of the view that they should not be deployed for matters pertaining to internal security.

Witness then withdrew.

5. The experts also responded to the queries raised by the members.

6. A copy of verbatim record of the proceedings has been kept.

**The Committee then adjourned.**

**MINUTES OF THE EIGHTEENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON DEFENCE (2008-09)**

The Committee sat on Wednesday, the 4<sup>th</sup> February 2009 from 1100 to 1215 hrs. in Committee Room 'B', Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

**PRESENT**

Shri Balasaheb Vikhe Patil - Chairman

**MEMBERS**

**LOK SABHA**

2. Shri Santosh Gangwar
3. Dr. K.S. Manoj
4. Shri Asaduddin Owaisi
5. Shri Arjun Charan Sethi

**RAJYA SABHA**

6. Shri Jai Parkash Aggarwal
7. Shri R.K. Dhawan
8. Shri K. B. Shanappa
9. Smt. Viplove Thakur

**SECRETARIAT**

1. Shri Devender Singh - Joint Secretary
2. Shri Rajeev Sharma - Director
3. Shri D.R. Shekhar - Deputy Secretary
4. Smt. J.M. Sinha - Under Secretary

**REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

1. Shri Vijay Singh - Defence Secretary
2. Shri M. Natarajan - SA to RM
3. Shri S.M. Acharya - Secretary (ESW)
4. Smt. H.K. Pannu - FA(DS)
5. Smt. Neelam Nath - Spl. Secretary (N)
6. Shri S.K. Sharma - DG (Acquisition)
7. Shri Shekhar Agarwal - FA (Acquisition)
8. Shri R.K. Mathur - Addl. Secy(M)
9. Shri Bimal Julka - JS (G/Air)
10. Shri Sanjeeva Kumar - JS (ESW)
11. Shri Ajay Tirkey - JS (E)
12. Shri S.N. Misra - JS(Aero)
13. Shri Amit Cowshish - Addl. FA(A)
14. Shri V. Somasundaran - JS (OF)
15. Shri T Ramachandru - JS(S)
16. Shri Mukesh Kumar Sinha - Dir. (Fin/Bud).

**ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS**

1.	Air Mshl S.C. Mukul	-	CISC
2.	Lt. Gen N. Thamburaj	-	VCOAS
3.	Vice Adml Raman P Suthan	-	VCNS
4.	Air Mshl T.S. Randhawa	-	DG(I&S)

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to the sitting of the Committee and drew their attention to the Direction 58 of the Directions by the Speaker, Lok Sabha. The Chairman then requested the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to brief the Committee on the subjects 'Status of implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces' and Action Taken Replies on the observations/ recommendations contained in the 29<sup>th</sup> Report of the Committee on 'Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2008-09'.

3. The representatives of the Ministry of Defence then briefed the Committee first on various issues pertaining to the subject 'Status of implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces' *viz.*, Mechanism to sort out differences among the services, provision of Joint Training at all levels in the armed forces, vertical & horizontal aspects of integration as identified by the HQ IDS, status of Indian National Defence University (INDU) and the linkages between the DRDO and HQ IDS, etc.

4. The Committee then took the oral evidence of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence on Action Taken Replies on the observations/ recommendations contained in the 29<sup>th</sup> Report of the Committee on 'Demands for Grants of the Ministry for the year 2008-09'. The Ministry of Defence briefed the Committee on status of trial and supply of Arjun Tanks, findings of the Rama Rao Committee on the working of DRDO, present status of Eleventh Plan, liberalized leave policy, self-certification of firms and issue pertaining to the light-weight systems for soldiers, etc.

5. The representatives of the Ministry then responded to the issues raised by the members. As regards, the points on which the representatives could not readily respond, the committee desired them to furnish written information at the earliest.

6. The copy of verbatim record of the proceedings has been kept.

**The Committee then adjourned.**

**MINUTES OF THE NINETEENTH SITTING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON DEFENCE (2008- 09)**

The Committee sat on Friday, the 20<sup>th</sup> February 2009 from 1000 to 1025 hrs. in Committee Room `C`, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

**PRESENT**

Shri Balasaheb Vikhe Patil - Chairman

**MEMBERS**

**LOK SABHA**

2. Shri Milind Murli Deora
3. Shri Santosh Gangwar
4. Shri Jigajinagi Ramesh Chandappa
5. Shri Suresh Kalmadi

**RAJYA SABHA**

6. Shri Jai Parkash Aggarwal
7. Shri R.K. Dhawan
8. Shri A. Elavarasan
9. Shri M.V. Mysura Reddy
10. Smt. Viplove Thakur

**SECRETARIAT**

1. Shri Devender Singh - Joint Secretary
2. Shri Rajeev Sharma - Director
3. Shri D.R. Shekhar - Deputy Secretary
4. Smt. J.M. Sinha - Under Secretary

2. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members to the sitting of the Committee. The Committee, thereafter, took up for consideration the following draft reports:

- (i) Action taken by the Government on the recommendations/observations contained in the Twenty-Ninth Report of the Committee on Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2008-09; and
- (ii) Status of implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces.

3. The Committee adopted both the aforesaid draft reports without any modification.

4. The Committee then authorized the Chairman to make verbal and consequential changes, if any, in the reports and present the same to the Parliament.

**The Committee then adjourned.**